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Abstract: 
A strong competitive position can not only be regarded as a key success factor for firms, but 
may also indicate market power. As with operators of other long-distance transport modes, 
like e.g. train or coach operators, assessing an airline’s overall competitive position is not 
trivial: This is because airlines serve many different, direct and indirect origin-destination 
(OD) markets between which competition intensity can vary immensely. Hence, airline (or 
rather airline group) networks compete against each other, meaning that “typical”, e.g. HHI-
based competition assessments at, e.g., the national, airport or direct route levels will not be 
sufficient to get a full picture. This paper presents a modelling approach for an indicator for 
the individual competitive positions (CP) of airlines and airline groups at the network level. 
An application to the intra-European market, based on OD data for 2015, indicates a quite 
comfortable competitive position for low cost carriers like Ryanair, WIZZ Air, FlyBE or 
Volotea, followed by the major airline groups (Lufthansa, Air France-KLM, IAG) which 
focus on hub and spoke networks along some low cost activities.  The weakest CP’s within 
our sample of the 30 largest European airlines and airline groups are calculated for leisure 
airlines like Monarch, which recently filed for bankruptcy.  
 
 
 
   
 
1. Introduction and objective 
From a business perspective, high market shares and hence a strong competitive position (CP) can be regarded as 
key success factors for firms (Buzzell et al, 1975). However, they can also indicate market power and a potential 
need for regulation. The term “competitive position” can be defined as the position a firm occupies in the whole 
relevant market, relative to its competitors (see e.g. Veldhuis, 1997).
1
  
 
In public passenger transportation, monopolization, market power and regulation intensity can highly vary 
between and even within transport modes and (world) regions. While market access and pricing in urban and 
regional transportation are usually regulated, there are a number of examples for major deregulation efforts in 
long-distance transport. These include intercity coach deregulation in the UK in 1980 (later followed by similar 
efforts undertaken in other European countries, such as Norway and Sweden in the 1990s, and eventually Italy, 
Germany and France in the 2010s – for an overview see e.g. Grimaldi et al, 2017), and the stepwise liberalization 
of EU passenger rail transport which shall result in an open market from 2020 (EU, 2016). 
 
Driven by the 1978 US Airline Deregulation Act,
2
 global air transport can be regarded as a forerunner in long-
distance transport market deregulation. The most prominent example for international air transport market 
liberalization certainly stems from Europe where a single (EU) market for air transport was completed in 1997 
and later further extended to neighbouring countries, forming the so-called European Common Aviation Area 
(EU, 2006). Without doubt, these new policies have led to an – overall – more competitive airline market in 
Europe, which is characterized by more routes and lower fares (e.g. Burghouwt and de Wit, 2015; Lieshout et al, 
2016). One major driver of this was the emergence and rise of low cost carriers (LCC) which put a lot of 
competitive pressure on sometimes slowly-reacting legacy carriers (see e.g. Dobruszkes, 2013; Doganis, 2006). 
However, competition intensity even varies within this deregulated European air transport market, as many 
routes and origin-destination (OD) markets are still monopolistic (Dobruszkes, 2009; Burghouwt and de Wit, 
2015). 
 
To assess the degree of competition hence requires appropriate market definition (see e.g. Baker, 2007), which is 
not a straightforward task. Competition analyses in air transport – as in other transport markets – are usually 
based on market structure assessments e.g. at isolated airport or national levels, or for selected (direct) routes. 
Typical concentration measures that are applied to the firms’ market shares (usually in terms of frequencies or 
seats) include the traditional Hirshman-Herfindahl index or, less often, the GINI coefficient or entropy. 
Such approaches, though, can fall short when it comes to the assessment of the overall, i.e. network-wide, 
competitive position of a particular carrier. The reason is that airlines serve many different (direct and indirect) 
origin-destination (sub-)markets between which competition levels will vary immensely, making “THE” overall 
competitive position of a carrier difficult to assess. 
This paper presents a modelling approach for an indicator for the overall competitive positions of airlines and 
airline groups at the network level, and applies it to the intra-European air transport market. The approach 
considers actual market shares on each single OD and the relative contribution of each OD to the airline’s or 
airline group’s total passenger volume, indicating the average network-wide extent to which the airline or airline 
group is contested by other (groups of) carriers. To our best knowledge, this perspective was not yet taken in any 
earlier paper. 
 
Hence, the methodology might provide useful, additional information e.g. for policy-makers or regulators, and 
probably also for analysts or e.g. fund managers, which might look for strong carriers to invest in. Its application 
is not limited to intra-European air transport market but could also be conducted for other regions or more 
specific questions, such as mergers. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant literature on competition in the airline 
market, with a special focus on Europe, and on the use of measures like HHI and their limitations when it comes 
to the assessment of an airline’s competitive position. In Section 3, our methodology and the dataset for Europe 
are presented. Section 4 then reports on the key results for airlines and airline groups in the intra-European air 
transport market, followed by some concluding remarks in Section 5. 
 
 
                                               
1 Other authors may apply different definitions, such as the way a product is perceived by the customers (e.g. Bowman and Faulkner, 1994). 
2 See Airline Deregulation Act 49 USC 1301 of 1978, available online at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-
Pg1705.pdf.  
   
 
2. Background and literature review 
Monopoly regulation may have to be applied to dominant firms that are steadily immune from any competitive 
market forces and hence in the position to raise prices or lower product qualities without losing their customers 
to other firms (Williamson, 1972). By implication, firms without noteworthy market power in a relevant market 
segment should, if at all, only be regulated with care as regulatory costs could quickly exceed the intended 
benefits and cause a net decline in welfare.  
 
Monopolisation and resulting market power can be an issue in many long-distance passenger transport markets, 
including air transport, and here especially in some of the upstream markets. The most relevant example is the 
air traffic control sector, where each airspace block is operated by a “regional monopoly”. Hence, airlines cannot 
choose between different ATM providers although they may have to deal with several providers along a given 
route (Button and McDougall, 2006). More diverse with regard to monopolization is the airport landscape. The 
market power of airport operators depends on various factors such as isolated versus overlapping catchment 
areas and resulting airport leakage effects, alternative hubs, or the degree of airline countervailing power (see 
e.g. Barrett, 2000; Button, 2010; Fuellhart, 2007;  Lian and Rønnevik, 2011; and Maertens, 2012). 
 
In contrast, downstream the value chain, at airline level, a far-reaching liberalization of markets is widely 
believed to have increased competition, be it from competing carriers on exactly the same routes (“route 
competition”), from and/or to alternative airports (Dobruszkes, 2009), or from alternative indirect connections 
(Alderighi et al, 2005; Pels, 2008). In addition, air transport services may face intermodal competition from other 
modes of transport, such as high-speed rail (see e.g. D’Alfonso et al, 2016, and the literature cited there), or, in 
the case of holiday traffic, even from routes to completely different destinations as leisure travellers might often 
be willing to fly to another destination than the originally envisaged one (Socorro et al, 2018). The latter two 
issues are not further tackled in this paper. 
 
A topical example for increasing indirect, i.e. “via-hub” competition on long haul markets is the rise of the Gulf 
carriers (Grimme, 2011; Grosche and Klophaus, 2015; O'Connell and Bueno, 2016) – or rather “BoGu“ 
(“Bosporus-Gulf”) or “ChiBoGu” (“China-Bosporus-Gulf”) carriers, to also pay tribute to the fast growing 
airlines from Turkey and China. All these carriers provide travellers with additional indirect route options 
between the “Western World” and places in the “Eastern Hemisphere” (Middle East, South-East Africa, Asia, 
Oceania). 
 
In the EU, internal market liberalization was completed in 1997, allowing community carriers to freely select 
routes and fares (EU, 1992). Neighbouring countries, such as the Balkan states, Norway and Iceland, followed in 
2006, leading to the formation of the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) (EU, 2006). The new policy 
regime paved the way for a more competitive air transport market which is now characterized by generally more 
routes and lower fares, mainly driven by the emergence and subsequent growth of LCC like Ryanair, EasyJet, 
Wizz Air, Vueling or Norwegian (Dobruszkes, 2013). All in all, between 2006 and 2015, the movement share of 
the LCC sector in intra-European air traffic grew from 19% to 30%, representing some 45,000 weekly departures 
(Maertens et al, 2016). At first sight, these large numbers, and the huge number of almost 300 different airlines 
operating in Europe,
3
 would hint at generally high levels of competition and hence relatively low degrees of 
market power. 
 
However, airport choice and network structure of many LCC have developed diversely: In the “early” post-
deregulation days, the most archetypical LCC like Ryanair or Wizz Air put a strong focus on providing 
alternative travel options from underserved secondary airports, including former military airfields. By this, they 
usually avoided any head-to-head competition with established airlines or other budget carriers.
4
 As a result, 
despite many new market entries, monopolies or duopolies at the route level did – in some cases – even increase 
although the EU air transport market as a whole got more competitive (Dobruszkes, 2009; Burghouwt and de 
Wit, 2015).  
                                               
3 As of 10 November, 2017, Flight Global’s fleet analyser database revealed 285 operating airlines for Europe (excluding Belarus, 
Greenland, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine). 
4 Easyjet, Germanwings or Buzz behaved slightly differently as they also served a number of established, major airports from the beginnings 
on. 
   
 
In the more recent past, then, direct route and airport competition by LCC has increased, even at some of the 
largest hubs like Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Madrid, Paris or Rome.
5
 Burghouwt and de Wit (2015) refer to this 
development as the fourth developmental phase following EU air transport liberalization.  
Despite this recent trend, we can still identify air transport market segments that tend to be characterized by only 
limited degrees of competition: 
 E.g. due to slot constraints, some airports are dominated by one or few airlines and/or are not yet served 
by a noteworthy number of LCC (e.g. London Heathrow, Zurich…). The hub carriers operating there 
are supposed to have a strong market position in the local, direct flight market, where they are likely 
able to charge “hub premiums” – an issue which was discussed controversially in the literature: While 
some authors found empirical evidence for hub premiums stemming (partly) from market power (e.g. 
Borenstein, 1992; Evans and Kessides, 1993; Lijesen et al, 2001), others explain higher fares charged 
by hub carriers for flights from their hubs with e.g. higher service levels rather than market power (e.g. 
Dresner and Windle, 1992). 
 A number of nonstop routes are served by one or two carriers only, which are often even (alliance) 
partners or airlines under the same ownership. A good example is the market within and between 
Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Belgium, which is now almost controlled by the Lufthansa Group.  
 In international air traffic, a number of direct country-pair markets are still monopolistic or duopolistic 
as many restrictive bilateral air service agreements still restrict capacities.  
 And there are even cases without competition from or between indirect routings. E.g., the airport of 
Graz (Austria) is dominated by feeder services to hubs of the Lufthansa Group (Frankfurt, Vienna…), 
meaning that indirect routings from most places to Graz cannot be considered to be in competition with 
each other.  
 
In brief, airlines in Europe serve many different “submarkets” with varying degrees of competition (Obermayer 
et al, 2013). Considering this, it is not trivial to assess an airline’s “overall” competitive position. A quite simple 
approach is to look at overall airline market shares at e.g. the airport, regional or national levels. Such 
approaches do, however, not consider the actual degrees of competition in all relevant OD markets. For example, 
the competitive position of airline A on a relation from O to D will not only depend on its own market share on 
the direct route from O to D relative to any competitors operating on the same route, but also on other airlines’ 
indirect supply via one or more hubs Hi – yet not counting above-mentioned competition from alternative 
airports and routes to alternative destinations, or from other modes of transport. Borenstein (1992) hence already 
argued that “measures of national concentration” are just “convenient reference points”. Also common are 
papers that assess the level of competition in air transport markets at e.g. the national, regional, direct route or 
airport levels, employing indicators like the Hirshman-Herfindahl index (HHI) (e.g. Dresner et al, 1996; Detzen 
et al, 2012; or lately Lieshout et al, 2016) which is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the 
individual firms in the market regarded as relevant, and hence may take values between close to zero (many 
firms with small market shares each) and one (one firm holding a market share of 1). The larger the HHI is, the 
higher the concentration. In addition, other measures that are sometimes used to assess the concentration in the 
air trapsort sector include the GINI coefficient (e.g. Reynolds-Feighan, 2001) and entropy  (e.g. Frenken et al, 
2004, or Dobruszkes, 2009). 
There is also anecdotal evidence that the consideration of competition at the nonstop route level only was a basis 
for legal decisions, at least in Germany. For example, in the Lufthansa-Eurowings merger case, the German 
Federal Cartel Office defined only the German domestic market as relevant and not all the different indirect 
markets from German spokes via hubs to the rest of the world (Bundeskartellamt, 2001). Another example was 
an obligation (set by the same authority) for Lufthansa not to undercut fares by newcomer Germania on the route 
Frankfurt-Berlin (FAZ.net, 2002). And also in the current discussions of the competitive impacts of the Air 
Berlin bankruptcy, the public eye is mainly on the isolated domestic, direct route level (e.g. Berliner 
Morgenpost, 2017). 
 
While the application of concentration measures like HHI is a straightforward way to describe the competitive 
situation in a pre-defined market, they cannot be used to assess the individual competitive position of firms that – 
like airlines – operate in many different sub-markets with varying degrees of competition. Hence, to our best 
knowledge, this paper takes a new approach in providing an approach for the assessment of the competitive 
position of European airlines at their total network level, considering actual competition in terms of market 
shares on all direct and indirect OD markets they serve.  
 
                                               
5 See current schedules and e.g. Dziedzic and Warnock-Smith (2016) and Dobruszkes et al (2017). 
   
 
This approach can make an interesting and useful new dimension e.g. for regulators and policymakers when e.g. 
judging on a particular airline’s market power, or for analysts and investors. The idea behind this network 
perspective is not entirely new, but earlier papers either tackled the role of network competition from a 
theoretical or conceptual perspective (e.g. Adler, 2001; Alderighi et al, 2005) or focused at the US domestic 
market only. An example for the latter is Borenstein (1992) who showed that HHI-concentration at the city-pair 
route level (incl. indirect routings) had decreased following the US deregulation act as airlines had switched their 
business models to hub&spoke network operations that tend to compete at the city-pair level. Veldhuis (1997) 
also looked at network competition, albeit from the airport perspective. He applied a (supply-based) connectivity 
model to assess the relative connectivity performance, or rather the connectivity potential, of airports. This 
paper, in contrast, takes an airline perspective and bases the approach on actual airline passenger flows, i.e. on 
actual demand patterns.   
 
 
3. Methodology and data 
An airline’s (relevant) market comprises all OD relations it actually sells tickets for, and hence not only the 
nonstop routes or a particular airport, region or country. Otherwise, large shares of the total traffic volumes of 
network carriers that fly passengers over their hubs would not be considered. We assume that airline i would  
have the strongest possible competitive position (CPi) if it was free from any intra-modal competition on all of 
its (sub-)markets, while it would be heavily contested if all its individual, OD-specific market shares were small. 
Relevant ODs are usually defined as airport pairs or, if alternative airports serving the same or a similar 
catchment area are regarded as interchangeable by the customers, as city pairs. As explained in the literature 
review section, competition from other modes of transport and from flights to other destinations can also have a 
competitive impact on airline i, but this is not further considered in this paper.  
 
We define the overall competitive position (CPi) of carrier i at the network level as the sum over all its OD-
specific market shares (MSij) in the OD markets j multiplied by the specific relevance of each ODj for airline i. 
The latter is proxied by the number of passengers of airline i on ODj (PAXij) divided by the airline’s total, 
network-wide passenger number PAXi
6
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The output of the indicator ranges from the theoretical value of 0.00 to 1.00. If an airline had a market share of 
100% in all of its OD markets, its CP would take the value of 1. This would indicate that the carrier was 
effectively free from any intra-modal competition, subject to the restrictions set above with regard to alternative 
airports and routes. If a carrier’s market shares on most of its ODs were small, the CP index would take a low 
value.   
 
 
Numerical example:  
Airline A serves three ODs and carries a total of 600,000 passengers: Munich-Frankfurt (200,000 pax), 
Frankfurt-Hamburg (100,000 pax), and Munich-Hamburg via Frankfurt (300,000 pax). Other airlines 
account for 100,000 passengers on Munich-Frankfurt, zero passengers on Frankfurt-Hamburg and 
200,000 travellers on Munich-Hamburg. 
 
The competitive position of Airline A then amounts to 0.68 and calculates as follows: 
 
CPA = MSA, MUC-FRA * PAXA, MUC-FRA / PAXA + MSA, FRA-HAM * PAXA, FRA-HAM / PAXA + MSA,MUC-HAM * 
PAXA,MUC-HAM / PAXA 
= 200,000/(200,000+100,000) * 200,000/600,000 + 100,000/(100,000+0) * 100,000/600,000 + 
300,000/(300,000+200,000) * 300,000/600,000 
= 0.67 * 0.33 + 1 * 0.167 + 0.6 * 0.5 = 0.68. 
 
 
                                               
6 Subject to data availability, airline- and origin-destination-specific revenue passenger kilometres (RPK) or total revenues (REV) could also 
be used to model the airline-specific relevance of each OD. 
   
 
With the exception of a 10% sample of airline tickets published by the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
(Airline Origin and Destination Survey DB1B),
7
 which however only covers the US market, OD passenger 
numbers at airline level are usually not disclosed publicly. Hence, for this paper, monthly passenger figures at 
the origin-destination and carrier levels were taken from the paid Sabre Market Intelligence (Sabre-MI) database 
(Sabre, 2014). This database uses MIDT (Marketing Information Data Tapes) booking data from global 
distribution systems like Sabre, Travelport and Amadeus as its main source of data, combined and adjusted with 
data from external sources and with estimations for increasingly important direct bookings and for the odd 
charter operations. Outputs of the Sabre database include leg (passenger numbers and average fares by airline, 
booking/cabin class and month at the segment, i.e. direct route level) and OD statistics (passenger numbers and 
average fares at the origin-destination level, as ticketed). ODs (partly) operated by train or coach are included 
and considered if the train or coach leg is part of the airline ticket, making use of a flight number. 
 
Sabre MI data (or its predecessor, Sabre ADI) have been referred to in a number of research papers and 
consultancy projects and studies. The quality of the dataset’s market size information, e.g. in terms of passenger 
numbers reported, is usually considered reliable, while it is likely to be less accurate when it comes to fares 
estimates for markets dominated by LCC with a high share of direct sales. Furthermore, self-connecting 
passenger flows are not captured by Sabre (e.g., Intervistas, 2014; PWC, 2014).  Earlier plausibility checks of the 
Sabre MI data were also conducted by the author in the context of a number of studies, e.g. in comparing 
segment- or airport-level passenger numbers reported by Sabre with data from other sources, such as the German 
Federal Statistical Office or Eurostat. Based on this, the quality of the Sabra dataset seems to increase with 
aggregation level. In other words, e.g. country-level data tends to be more accurate that (small) city- or route-
level data. This might, in principle, be critical for this work which is based on passenger volumes at the city- and 
airport-pair level. Nevertheless, for the following reasons, it is reasonable to assume that the quality of the 
dataset will be sufficient for the purpose of this paper: First, there are no hints for a systematic bias at the 
expense of specific airlines, which would affect the individual CP results; and second, the analysis is based on a 
complete collection of all passenger OD-flows within Europe and not on an extrapolation of a small, potentially 
biased sample. 
 
The actual calculations were performed with Microsoft Excel. To scale the massive amount of data down, 
September 2015 was chosen as reference and not the full year. September is believed to be a good proxy for the 
annual average as this month is characterized both by solid business and leisure demand. For this reason, 
September figures are also used as reference in Airbus’ Global market forecast (Airbus, 2017). 
 
For the case study in this paper, only traffic from, to and within the Sabre-MI regions Eastern Europe and 
Western Europe was taken into account (see Table 1), as we aim at assessing the competitive situations of 
airlines in the intra-European market. This selection better allows for comparisons between the CPs of LCC 
(which hardly serve any long haul routes) and the intra-European businesses of the full service network carriers 
(FSNC).  
The Sabre MI region “Eastern Europe” includes basically all of geographical Europe including the whole of 
Russia, while Turkey is fully excluded. We are aware that geographically large parts of Russia are located in 
Asia. However, traffic figures for the Asian part of Russia are relatively small as the indicator is based on 
passenger numbers rather than on revenue passenger kilometers (to which the long flight distances to Far East 
Russia would contribute relatively stronger). According to traffic data by the Russian Federal Agency of air 
transport
8
, 88% of the airport traffic at Russia’s Top 20 airports in 2015 was handled at airports in the country’s 
European part.    
 
Most traffic within the selected Sabre MI regions takes place in a fully deregulated market environment. 
However, there might be some markets outside the ECAA where restrictions on market access may still be 
imposed. As we have no access to exact Governmental agreements on traffic rights, and as those would most 
likely reveal a range of many different forms of market regulation (from probably very closed markets to almost 
open market entry), this paper cannot consider OD-specific degrees of market regulation. 
 
Table 1: Definition of Europe 
                                               
7 An overview of the dataset is provided here: https://www.transtats.bts.gov/DatabaseInfo.asp?DB_ID=125.  
8 Source: http://www.favt.ru/dejatelnost-ajeroporty-i-ajerodromy-osnovnie-proizvodstvennie-pokazateli-aeroportov-obyom-perevoz/   
   
 
Albania 
Armenia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Bosnia And 
Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark  
Estonia  
Faeroe Islands 
Finland 
France 
Georgia 
Germany 
Gibraltar 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland  
Italy 
Kosovo  
Latvia  
Lithuania  
Luxembourg 
Macedonia 
Malta 
Moldova 
Monaco 
Montenegro 
Netherlands 
Norway  
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania  
Russian Federation  
Serbia  
Slovakia  
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
Source: Sabre MI database. 
 
  
   
 
4. Key results and discussion 
4.1 Perspectives of the analysis 
The calculation of the CP values was first performed at individual airline operator level. As airlines are, 
however, not always financially or strategically independent from each other and hence cannot always be 
regarded as competitors, a second iteration was performed at the airline group level, to control for common 
ownership. For this, a modified dataset was used for which OD passenger numbers had been aggregated to 
airline groups (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Airline groups 
Airline Group  Airlines 
Aeroflot Group Aeroflot, Rossiya, Orenburg Airlines, Donavia 
Air Berlin Group airberlin, NIKI, Belair, LGW 
Air France-KLM 
(AF-KLM) 
Air France, Transavia Airlines, Transavia France, Brit Air, KLM, Regional, KLM 
Cityhopper 
EasyJet Group EasyJet, EasyJet Switzerland 
International Airline 
Group (IAG) 
British Airways, Iberia (Express), Aer Lingus, Vueling, BA Cityflyer, Open Skies 
Lufthansa Group Lufthansa, Germanwings, SWISS, Austrian, Brussels Airlines, Lufthansa Cityline, 
Eurowings, Edelweiss, Air Dolomiti, Tyrolean 
Norwegian Norwegian Air Shuttle, Norwegian Air International 
SAS Group SAS, Blue1, Wideroe 
Sunexpress Sunexpress, Sunexpress Germany 
Thomas Cook Condor, Thomas Cook Airlines (UK), Condor Berlin, Thomas Cook Airlines Scandinavia 
TUI TUIFly, TUI Airlines Belgium, TUIFly Nordic, Thomson Airways, TUI Airlines 
Nederland, Corsair 
 
In addition, the assessment was not only undertaken at the airport level (incl. train/coach stations with IATA 
code), but also at the city level, to better reflect the idea that OD level competition may also stem from other 
origin and/or destination airports serving similar catchments (e.g. Dobruszkes, 2009). Hence, we compiled 
another dataset at IATA city-code level (see Annex 1). We are aware that, in reality, competition may also come 
from airports using a different IATA city designator. Such effects, however, could not be modelled here. Table 3 
summarizes the four levels of analysis. 
 
Table 3: Different levels of analysis  
 Consideration of airport competition at city level 
No Yes 
Consideration of airline common ownership 
No Airline operator & 
Airport pair level 
Airline operator  
& City pair level 
Yes Airline Group  
& Airport pair level 
Airline Group  
& City pair level 
 
In total, the dataset reveals 56.57 Mio. departing intra-European OD travelers for our sample month September 
2015. In the following, we report and discuss the CP results for the 30 largest operating carriers and airline 
groups, respectively. We further differentiate between CP results at the airport pair and at the city pair levels.  
 
4.2 Airline operator level results 
The analysis was first run at the airline level, regarding each operating airline as a separate player irrespectively 
of any forms of common ownership (Table 4). The 30 largest airline operators in intra-European OD traffic 
combined accounted for 42.95 Mio. passengers in September 2015 and hence represented 76% of the total intra-
European OD traffic. Interestingly, four of the five largest intra-European aircraft operators were low cost 
carriers (Ryanair, EasyJet, Vueling and Norwegian), and some formerly big players missed the Top 30, among 
them Brussels Airlines (428k), Iberia (411k) and Finnair (320k). 
 
   
 
The results at airline operator and airport-pair levels indicate an average, intra-European CP of the Top 30 
airlines of 0.58, which however varies between just 0.36 (Monarch) and as much as 0.90 (Wizz Air Hungary). 
Other airlines with a high CP value include Ryanair, Flybe and Aeroflot (0.83 each), followed by EasyJet and 
Air France (0.71), which means that a large share of the passengers of these airlines have no alternative intra-
modal travel option between the same origin and destination airports. These results sound logical: Compared to 
fellow LCC . EasyJet (0.71), Vueling (0.58) or Norwegian (0.61), WIZZ Air and Ryanair still operate many 
routes from secondary and regional airports that are neither served directly nor indirectly by any other carrier, 
while the high CP value for Flybe  may be explained by the fact that the carrier is a hybrid regional/low cost 
airline operating from many secondary, niche and regional airports, including those with only short runways that 
could not be fully used by other carriers.  
 
Table 4: CP results (Airline operator perspective) 
 
 Airline operator perspective Competitive Position (CP) 
3LC Airline # Departing intra-
European OD Pax 
(Sep’15) 
Airport-
Pair  
City-
Pair 
Diff. 
FR Ryanair            8,183,422    0.83 0.61 -0.22 
U2 EasyJet Airline Company Limited            5,875,534    0.71 0.50 -0.22 
VY Vueling Airlines             2,521,752    0.58 0.51 -0.06 
DY Norwegian Air Shuttle             2,419,378    0.61 0.52 -0.09 
LH Deutsche Lufthansa             1,872,950    0.52 0.47 -0.04 
BA British Airways             1,640,341    0.57 0.29 -0.28 
AF Air France            1,590,711    0.71 0.61 -0.09 
W6 Wizz Air Hungary             1,590,321    0.90 0.71 -0.18 
SK Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS)            1,488,628    0.49 0.42 -0.07 
SU Aeroflot Russian Airlines            1,472,518    0.83 0.44 -0.39 
AB Air Berlin             1,437,270    0.49 0.44 -0.04 
4U Germanwings             1,227,886    0.57 0.54 -0.04 
AZ Alitalia-Compagnia Aerea Italiana                961,531    0.55 0.35 -0.19 
BE Flybe               872,072    0.83 0.73 -0.10 
EI Aer Lingus                777,212    0.64 0.47 -0.16 
LS Jet2.com                757,719    0.48 0.45 -0.04 
X3 Tuifly                756,003    0.41 0.40 -0.02 
S7 Siberia Airlines               749,225    0.60 0.35 -0.25 
UN Transaero Airlines               723,467    0.52 0.30 -0.22 
A3 Aegean Airlines                713,458    0.54 0.50 -0.05 
LX Swiss International Air Lines                674,253    0.45 0.41 -0.04 
ZB Monarch Airlines               578,962    0.36 0.30 -0.06 
TP TAP Air Portugal               562,560    0.55 0.48 -0.07 
KL KLM Royal Dutch Airlines               556,248    0.40 0.35 -0.05 
UX Air Europa Lineas Aereas                541,365    0.41 0.35 -0.06 
OS Austrian Airlines AG dba Austrian               533,360    0.46 0.43 -0.02 
HV Transavia Airlines               521,133    0.69 0.68 -0.01 
DE Condor Flugdienst                461,945    0.40 0.37 -0.03 
UT Utair Aviation                451,755    0.65 0.38 -0.27 
FV Rossiya Airlines                440,142    0.61 0.58 -0.03 
Sum (Pax) / unweighted average (CP) 42,953,124 0.58 0.47  
 
   
 
The CPs of the largest intra-European network carriers (Lufthansa, British Airways, Air France, SAS, Alitalia), 
but also smaller ones like TAP Air Portugal or Aegean Airlines end up in a range between  ~0.50 and ~0.70.  Air 
France (0.71) scores relatively high which seems to stem from a strong position on many French domestic routes 
and on indirect ODs from smaller places in France. For example, at airport pair level, the dataset shows high 
market shares for Air France on high-volume ODs from e.g. Paris Orly to Toulouse (82.01%), Nice (74.69%), 
Bordeaux (~100%) and Marseille (~100%).  
 
Air Berlin, which has gone bankrupt in the meantime, scored lower (0.49) than rival Lufthansa, which may be 
explained by a higher focus on leisure routes to the Mediterranean which are – in many cases – also offered by 
low cost or leisure carriers. 
 
Aeroflot is the only network carrier in the Top 30 with a CP exceeding 0.80. The main reasons for this are 
supposed to be a) the specialized location of Moscow as a transfer point for indirect traffic flows in Eastern 
Europe, and b), for ODs from and to Moscow, the large number of exclusively-served routes from Sheremetyevo 
Airport, while competing Russian airlines as well as many operators from other countries use the airports of 
Domodedovo or Vnukovo. 
 
Hence, it comes with no surprise that the CPs of Aeroflot (0.83 -> 0.44) and its smaller, Domodedovo-based 
competitors Siberia (0.60 -> 0.35) and Transaero (0.52 -> 0.30) decline significantly if their CP values are 
calculated at the more realistic city pair level, assuming that most travelers flying into or out of Moscow may – 
in principle – be willing to use either of these airports. For example, we could identify market shares of close to 
100% for Aeroflot’s three biggest routes from Sheremetyevo to St. Petersburg, Simferopol and Sochi, which all 
plummet to 13-25% when flights from alternative Moscovian airports like Vnukovo and Domodedovo are 
considered as competitors. The city level CP value for Transaero, which also ceased operations in the meantime, 
is especially low as this airline linked Moscow with many “typical” destinations not only within Russia, but also 
e.g. in Spain or Greece which are also served by other Russian network and holiday carriers. 
 
The same also applies to Ryanair and EasyJet, which often focus on selected airports in multiple-airport cities 
(e.g. Stansted, Gatwick, or Luton in London, Ciampino in Rome, Charleroi in Brussels, Schoenefeld in 
Berlin,…). Hence, their CP values also decline if the modelling approach is conducted at the city pair level 
(Ryanair: 0.83 -> 0.61; EasyJet: 0.71 -> 0.50). 
 
Similarly, given the large number of alternative airports in the London area compared to e.g. Paris, Frankfurt or 
Munich, the intra-European CP value of British Airways declines much stronger (0.57 -> 0.29) than the ones for 
e.g. Air France (0.71 -> 0.61) or Lufthansa (0.52 -> 0.47) if the city-to-city perspective is taken. 
 
Airlines with CP values below 50% have only a minor market share on the average OD relation they serve, 
which could mean that their fares and revenues are more exposed to competition – although this paper does not 
contain any assessment of the relation between an airline’s CP and its actual pricing power. Prominent examples 
for airlines with very low CPs come from the leisure segment: The airline with the lowest CPs among the Top 30 
was Monarch (0.36 at airport-to-airport level, 0.30 at city-to-city level), which had a high degree of overlapping 
airport pairs with EasyJet (as Luton and Gatwick are among the biggest bases for both of them) and recently 
went bankrupt (Forbes, 2017). Other leisure airlines include Condor (0.40/0.37) and TUIFly (0.41/0.40) which 
both compete with many carriers on routes from Germany to the Mediterranean, Mallorca-based Air Europa 
(0.41/0.35) and UK-based Jet2 (0.48/0.45).  
 
A somewhat surprising result is the relatively low intra-European CP for KLM (0.41/0.35). One explanation may 
be that Amsterdam is now well served by LCC on direct trunk routes, and that KLM heavily offers indirect 
connections between the UK and other places in Western Europe, which are often also served by LCC. 
4.3 Airline group level results 
One drawback of the above assessment is the individual airline level perspective, which implies that all other 
aircraft operators are regarded as competitors. However, in reality, many carriers are part of the same airline 
group, be it because of mergers, acquisitions or the formation of subsidiaries. Hence, a second model run was 
done, this time for a modified dataset in which airlines were merged into airline groups (Table 2). For instance, 
Austrian, Swiss, Brussels Airlines and Germanwings are part of the Lufthansa Group, while International Airline 
Group (IAG) consists of airlines like British Airways, Iberia (Express), Aer Lingus, Vueling and BA Cityflyer. 
 
The 30 largest independent airlines and airline groups in Europe, as shown in Table 5, together accounted for 
50.03 Mio. passengers in September 2015, which equals 88% of the total intra-European passenger volume. 
   
 
Ryanair and EasyJet still head the Top 30 but are now followed by the major, FSNC-led airline groups IAG, 
Lufthansa Group and Air France-KLM.   
 
Table 5: CP results (Airline group perspective) 
 
Airline group perspective Competitive Position (CP) 
3LC Airline group 
# Departing intra-
European Pax (Sep’15) Airport-Pair  City-Pair Diff. 
FR Ryanair            8,183,422    0.83 0.61 -0.22 
U2 EasyJet            5,875,543    0.71 0.50 -0.22 
IAG International Airline Group (IAG)            5,494,479    0.63 0.47 -0.15 
LHG Lufthansa Group            5,467,433    0.63 0.58 -0.05 
AFKLM Air France-KLM            3,680,138    0.68 0.63 -0.06 
DY Norwegian            2,419,384    0.61 0.52 -0.09 
SU Aeroflot Group            2,309,340    0.80 0.55 -0.25 
AB Air Berlin Group            2,149,205    0.56 0.52 -0.03 
SK SAS Group            1,731,875    0.54 0.48 -0.06 
W6 Wizz Air             1,590,321    0.90 0.71 -0.18 
AZ Alitalia            1,116,584    0.60 0.38 -0.22 
BY TUI            1,006,012    0.46 0.43 -0.03 
BE Flybe Limited                872,072    0.83 0.73 -0.10 
A3 Aegean Airlines                 828,722    0.61 0.57 -0.04 
LS Jet2.com                 757,719    0.48 0.45 -0.04 
S7 Siberia Airlines                749,225    0.60 0.35 -0.25 
UN Transaero Airlines                723,467    0.52 0.30 -0.22 
TP TAP Air Portugal                659,420    0.56 0.49 -0.07 
ZB Monarch Airlines                578,962    0.36 0.30 -0.06 
MT Thomas Cook                566,944    0.37 0.34 -0.03 
UX Air Europa                541,365    0.41 0.35 -0.06 
UT UTair Aviation                451,755    0.65 0.38 -0.27 
U6 Ural Airlines                419,372    0.37 0.30 -0.07 
AY Finnair                 320,512    0.50 0.47 -0.03 
V7 Volotea                 314,083    0.72 0.67 -0.05 
DP First Choice Airways Limited                286,692    0.68 0.33 -0.35 
IG Meridiana Fly                 268,168    0.69 0.61 -0.08 
QS Travel Service                 256,174    0.81 0.81 0.00 
LO LOT - Polish Airlines                216,094    0.59 0.51 -0.08 
NN VIM Airlines                198,218    0.36 0.25 -0.12 
 
Sum          50,032,703    0.60 0.49 
  
On (unweighted) average, the CP results for the airline groups (0.60 from the airport pair perspective versus 0.49 
at city pair level) slightly surpass those at airline level (0.58 versus 0.47). This observation comes as expected as 
ODs offered by two or more airlines of the same group are no longer regarded as competing ones. For example, 
the consolidated market share of Lufthansa Group on the OD from Frankfurt to Vienna amounts to ~100%, 
while the airline-level approach would consider the individual market shares of Lufthansa (51.46%) and Austrian 
Airlines (48%), respectively.  
 
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between airline (group) size and CP value from the city pair perspective, which 
we regard as more realistic than the airport pair level. For better illustration, different airline business models are 
   
 
marked with different symbols (circle = low cost carrier, diamond = FSNC or airline group dominated by FSNC, 
square = leisure airline, triangle = other/hybrid airline). 
 
Figure 1: Competitive Position of Europe’s 30 largest airlines and airline groups (city-pair perspective) 
 
 
 
As already indicated in the airline-level discussion above, it shows that low cost carriers (Flybe: 0.73, Wizz Air: 
0.71, Volotea: 0.67, Ryanair: 0.61; Norwegian: 0.52, EasyJet: 0.50) tend to achieve relatively higher CP values 
than the other business models. Especially Flybe, Volotea and Wizzair, three relatively small and specialized 
LCC, remain above 0.70, which may be explained by a high share of exclusively served ODs even at city pair 
level. We count more than 170 city pairs exceeding 2,000 passengers per months on which Wizz Air held a 
market share of more than 80%, led by Kattowitz-Dortmund (19,490 travelers in September 2015; 99.2% market 
share), Budapest-Eindhoven (19,435; 99.5%) and London-Cluj (19,258; 98.4%). And Flybe operated about 76 
routes with more than 2,000 monthly passengers and a market share exceeding 80%, including Birmingham-
Edinburgh (23,081 passengers), Birmingham-Glasgow (18,550) and Southampton-Edinburgh (17,201), all with 
market shares of almost 100%. 
 
The network carriers (including those airline groups that are dominated by a FSNC) account for CP values 
between 0.3 and 0.63, whereby the larger players tend to reach CP values of more than 0.50. The only exception 
here is IAG (0.47), which is strongly contested by LCC like Ryanair and EasyJet in all of its intra-European key 
markets (London, Madrid, Barcelona, Dublin). From the city pair perspective, Aeroflot Group (0.55) scores 
better than Aeroflot alone (0.44 – see Table 4). This is because leading regional carriers in Russia (e.g. Rossiya 
and Donavia), which account for high market shares on certain routes, are also part of the Aeroflot Group. 
 
As already discussed in Section 4.2, the results again reveal that dedicated leisure airlines and leisure airline 
groups like TUI (0.43), Jet2.com (0.45), Monarch (0.30), Thomas Cook (0.34) or First Choice (0.33) struggle 
most to achieve a comfortable competitive position. For TUI and Thomas Cook, the consideration of the whole 
groups hardly improves the overall CP value, which might be explained by the fact that the individual carriers 
tend to operate in completely different markets, e.g. TUIFly from Germany, Corsair from France or Thomson 
Airways from the UK. 
 
Hybrid airlines that are difficult to allocate to ideal-typical business models include Travel Service, Meridiana 
Fly, Air Berlin or Air Europa. The CP values calculated for these airlines differ immensely. Travel Service 
(0.81) focuses on nonstop services from Prague under the Smartwings brand, often without any direct 
competition, while Air Berlin and Air Europa were/are examples for “me-too” carriers combining elements of 
different business models (holiday flights, long haul flights, intra-European city flights) at a smaller scale than 
their main rivals Lufthansa and Iberia, respectively. 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion and Limitations 
Measuring an airline’s competitive position is complex as airlines serve many different (direct and indirect) 
markets with varying degrees of competition. Hence, networks compete against each other, meaning that the 
“typical” competition assessment at the airport or (direct) route level may not be sufficient in all cases. 
 
Based on traffic flow data at the OD level, this paper presented an approach to assess the CP of airlines and 
airline groups at the network level, considering the actual competitive situation on each single OD and the 
relative importance of each OD in relation to the airline’s total output in terms of passenger numbers. 
 
Results for Europe for September 2015 indicate that low cost carriers like Ryanair, Wizz Air or Flybe tend to 
score highest, with CP values clearly exceeding 50% in most cases, which means that these carriers reach 
average market shares of more than 50% over all ODs they serve. This can be explained by a high(er) share of 
routes from and to secondary and regional airports, which are not always competed by other carriers.  
 
Dedicated holiday carriers are most exposed to competition, especially from LCC on trunk routes to the 
Mediterranean. Their CP values usually remain clearly below 50%, while those of the larger network carriers 
(and respective airline groups), are usually above 50%, but well below those of the above mentioned LCC. The 
CP values for smaller network carriers, in contrast, remain below 50%.   
 
Airlines like Ryanair, EasyJet and Aeroflot are examples for carriers that achieve much higher CP values if the 
assessment is done at the airport pair level and not at the city pair level. The reason for this is that these carriers 
operate (some of) their main bases in multi-airport cities like London or Moscow where direct route competition 
is less relevant that competing flights from alternative airports. This suggests that more airport choice in a given 
region, e.g. achieved through good ground access to alternative airports, will clearly help increasing airline 
competition. 
 
Our approach might be useful e.g. for policymakers, regulators or analysist and investors. For example, in cartel 
cases on mergers that might result in route or airport dominance, it could be worth looking at an airline’s overall 
CP value (and at the simulated CP value for the merged firm) before e.g. imposing route- or airport-specific 
limitations. Other, topical cases for the application of this approach could be questions such as on the 
competitive impact of LCC or Gulf carriers on the European network carriers. The latter tend to complain that 
more and more traffic rights for Gulf carriers would mean more (and unfair) competition for them, but it should 
be investigated if there really is that much competition at the actually relevant OD levels, given that the focus of 
FSNC like Lufthansa is on the Europe-North East Asia axis, while Gulf carriers are stronger to e.g. South East 
Asia and Oceania.     
 
There is a range of limitations to the approach, which could be tackled in future research. First, alternative 
airports are only considered as competitors if they make use of the same city code. The model could hence be 
enhanced by a more sophisticated identification of alternative airports, considering actual airport access from 
relevant catchment areas. The same applies to the consideration of inter-modal competition. Second, while the 
assessment at the airline group level already helps to depict actual competition between airlines in a more 
realistic way, the roles and competitive impacts of alliances and joint ventures are not yet considered. While joint 
ventures hardly play a role in intra-European traffic, they are a common phenomenon on the transatlantic axis 
(Fabey, 2010) or on routes between e.g. Germany and China (Lufthansa – Air China JV). Third, this paper 
suggested that the topic might be of relevance e.g. for investors and analysts, but it does not (yet) provide 
evidence for any correlation between the CP value and an airline’s financial position. Finally, a time-series 
approach could be applied to depict the development of the airline-specific CP values over time. 
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Annex 1: Airports sharing the same IATA city code 
 
Origin 
Airport Origin Airport Name Origin City Name Origin Country Name 
BFS Belfast International Apt Belfast United Kingdom 
BHD Belfast City Apt Belfast United Kingdom 
TXL Berlin Tegel Apt Berlin Germany 
SXF Berlin Schonefeld Apt Berlin Germany 
CRL Brussels South Charleroi Airport Brussels Belgium 
BRU Brussels National Airport Brussels Belgium 
OTP Bucharest Otopeni Apt Bucharest Romania 
PSA Florence Pisa Airport Florence Italy 
FLR Florence Amerigo Vespucci Florence Italy 
FRA Frankfurt International Apt Frankfurt Germany 
HHN Frankfurt Hahn Airport Frankfurt Germany 
GLA Glasgow International Airport Glasgow United Kingdom 
PIK Glasgow Prestwick Apt Glasgow United Kingdom 
GOT Gothenburg Landvetter Apt Gothenburg Sweden 
GSE Gothenburg Saeve Apt Gothenburg Sweden 
HAM Hamburg Fuhlsbuettel Airport Hamburg Germany 
LBC Hamburg Luebeck Airport Hamburg Germany 
IEV Kiev Zhulyany Apt Kiev Ukraine 
KBP Kiev Borispol Apt Kiev Ukraine 
STN London Stansted Apt London United Kingdom 
LHR London Heathrow Apt London United Kingdom 
LGW London Gatwick Apt London United Kingdom 
LTN London Luton Apt London United Kingdom 
LCY London City Apt London United Kingdom 
LYS Lyon Saint Exupery Apt Lyon France 
GNB Lyon Grenoble Saint Geoirs Apt Lyon France 
LYN Lyon Bron Apt Lyon France 
MAN Manchester International Apt Manchester United Kingdom 
LPL Liverpool Manchester United Kingdom 
MXP Milan Malpensa Apt Milan Italy 
LIN Milan Linate Apt Milan Italy 
BGY Milan Orio Al Serio Milan Italy 
PMF Milan Parma Apt Milan Italy 
MSQ Minsk International Apt 2 Minsk Belarus 
MHP Minsk International Apt 1 Minsk Belarus 
DME Moscow Domodedovo Apt Moscow Russia 
SVO Moscow Sheremetyevo Apt Moscow Russia 
VKO Moscow Vnukovo Apt Moscow Russia 
BSL Euroairport Basel Mulhouse/Basel Switzerland 
MLH Euroairport Mulhouse Mulhouse/Basel Switzerland 
MUC Munich International Airport Munich Germany 
AGB Munich Augsburg Apt Munich Germany 
   
 
EMA Nottingham East Midlands Airport Nottingham United Kingdom 
NQT Nottingham Airport Nottingham United Kingdom 
OSL Oslo Airport Oslo Norway 
TRF Oslo Torp Airport Oslo Norway 
ORY Paris Orly Apt Paris France 
CDG Paris Charles De Gaulle Apt Paris France 
BVA Paris Beauvais-Tille Airport Paris France 
KEF Reykjavik Keflavik Apt Reykjavik Iceland 
RKV Reykjavik Apt Reykjavik Iceland 
FCO Rome Fiumicino Apt Rome Italy 
CIA Rome Ciampino Apt Rome Italy 
SCS Shetland Islands Scatsta Apt Shetland Islands United Kingdom 
LSI Shetland Islands Sumburgh Apt Shetland Islands United Kingdom 
LWK Shetland Islands Lerwick/Tingwall Apt Shetland Islands United Kingdom 
ARN Stockholm Arlanda Apt Stockholm Sweden 
BMA Stockholm Bromma Apt Stockholm Sweden 
NYO Stockholm Skavsta Airport Stockholm Sweden 
VST Stockholm Vasteras Apt Stockholm Sweden 
TFN Tenerife Norte Apt Tenerife Spain 
TFS Tenerife Sur Reina Sofia Apt Tenerife Spain 
VCE Venice Marco Polo Apt Venice Italy 
TSF Venice Treviso Apt Venice Italy 
Source: Sabre MI database. 
 
